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Jones v. Harris Associates: 
Shareholders’ Consolation Prize 
in the Mutual Fund Fee Debate 
 
Nicole Grospe* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Mutual funds have become one of the most popular 
investment vehicles for Americans today.1 The mutual fund 
industry manages assets for more than ninety million 
Americans.2 Unfortunately, these shareholders are feeling the 
detrimental effects of the structure of mutual funds and their 
fees. One of the biggest issues in the mutual fund industry is 
the risk of excessive fees. Many difficulties arise because of the 
relationship between a mutual fund‟s adviser and its board of 
directors, where both are essentially in positions to bite the 
hand that feeds them. The adviser not only manages the fund 
but also chooses the board. The “captive” board in turn 
determines the adviser‟s compensation. As a result, the 
relationships of these captive funds often lead to excessive fees. 
Congress has attempted to prevent this dilemma by passing 
the Investment Company Act of 1940. In particular, Section 
36(b) provides that advisers and boards have a fiduciary duty 
to shareholders in charging reasonable fees.3 
The mutual fund industry and its shareholders have since 
 
* J.D., Pace University School of Law, 2011; B.S., Cornell University, 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 2007. The Author would like to 
thank Professor Edward Pekarek for his guidance and the staff of Pace Law 
Review for their efforts. 
1. Caroline J. Dillon, Do You Get What You Pay for? A Look at the High 
Fees and Low Protections of Mutual Funds, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281, 
282. 
2. John P. Freeman et. al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence 
and A Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 83 (2008). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000). 
1
772 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:2 
been impacted by judicial review and interpretation of the 
Section 36(b) fiduciary duty standard. The longstanding 
approach, established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,4 held 
mutual fund fees to be excessive if the fees charged were “so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable 
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been 
the product of arm‟s-length bargaining.”5 While the standard 
did not foreclose investor lawsuits against funds, no plaintiff 
investor has ever won a lawsuit under Gartenberg. In Jones v. 
Harris Associates,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
turned this standard of Section 36(b) on its head, rejecting the 
Gartenberg opinion and advocating for an approach that would 
make it even more difficult for investors to bring suit for 
excessive mutual fund adviser compensation. The United 
States Supreme Court, in its March 30, 2010 opinion, overruled 
the Seventh Circuit decision and affirmed the Gartenberg 
standard. 
This Note provides a critique of the Supreme Court 
decision in Jones. First, this Note offers an overview of the 
structure of mutual funds and their fees, as well as a 
background of a mutual fund‟s fiduciary duty under Section 
36(b) of the Investment Company Act. Next, it contrasts the 
standard of Section 36(b) established in Gartenberg with the 
standard announced by the Seventh Circuit in Jones. Finally, 
this Note analyzes the Supreme Court‟s decision to affirm the 
Gartenberg standard and ultimately argues that the Court 
should have done more to protect the interests of shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 
at 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). 
5. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
6. Jones, 527 F.3d 627. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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II. Mutual Funds: Structure and Fees 
 
A. Structure 
 
Mutual funds are open-ended funds7 operated by 
investment companies that pool money from shareholders and 
invest it in stocks, bonds, and other financial securities.8 The 
organization of a mutual fund involves an investment adviser, 
an underwriter of the fund‟s shares, and a custodian.9 This 
Note focuses on the investment adviser. “The investment 
adviser is a professional money-manager, independent of, but 
tightly connected to, the mutual fund.”10 Typically, the 
investment adviser is an investment company that provides 
one or more mutual funds with investment services.11 The 
adviser is responsible for investing the fund‟s assets and 
handling the day-to-day management of the fund, such as 
procuring staff, office-space, and overseeing administrative 
staff.12 The adviser also establishes and controls the fund‟s 
board of directors. Legal requirements mandate the mutual 
fund boards be populated by independent directors.13 Advisers‟ 
employees often obtain seats on the board as a result of the 
adviser‟s ultimate control.14 
The adviser often organizes the fund‟s board with directors 
who have business or personal connections to the adviser or its 
executives.15 The relationship between the adviser and the 
 
7. An open-end fund is one that has no restrictions on the amount of 
shares that it will issue and buys back its shares at current asset value. 
BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1045 (8th ed. 2004). 
8. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n, Mutual Fund, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mutual-fund-help.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2011). 
9. William P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Fund 
Management Fees: How Much is Too Much?, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063 
(1982). 
10. Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee 
Cases: Ripe for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 152 (2009). 
11. Dillon, supra note 1, at 284. 
12. Id. at 283-84. 
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-10 (West 2010). 
14. See Dillon, supra note 1, at 284. 
15. John M. Greabe et al., Moving Beyond Gartenberg: A Process-Based 
and Comparative Approach to Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 
3
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fund is crucial. “The Second Circuit, in [Gartenberg v. Merrill 
Lynch], described the board‟s relationship with its fund as 
virtually „unseverable.‟”16 Because of the close relationship 
between advisers and mutual funds, mutual funds are often 
called captives of their advisers.17 “Because of this „unseverable‟ 
relationship, the fund is usually limited to buying advisory 
services from a single provider.”18 
 
B. Mutual Fund Fees 
 
The structure of mutual funds can have a problematic 
effect on advisory fees charged to mutual fund investors.19 
“Fees, which compensate advisers for portfolio management, 
are negotiated annually between the adviser and its captive 
fund‟s board.”20 Because the adviser and the board negotiate 
the fees, the negotiations are rarely at arm‟s length. “Not 
surprisingly, advisers typically do not negotiate fee agreements 
by vying against each other to land advisory contracts from 
mutual funds that are already up and operating. Rather, they 
create their own mutual fund „clients‟ by forming, marketing, 
and managing the funds they advise.”21 The compensation is an 
advisory fee paid out of the assets of a fund. As a result, this 
may lead to the possibility of a windfall to the adviser. “When 
fund assets, and thus advisory fees, swell over time, but the 
advisor does not institute appropriate concomitant fee 
decreases (called „breakpoints‟) to account for diminishing 
marginal management costs, the adviser pockets these huge 
sums.”22 
 
 
 
 
1940, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 133, 136 (2008). 
16. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84. 
17. Dillon, supra note 1, at 284. 
18. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84. 
19. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 138 
20. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 84. 
21. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 136. 
22. Id. at 183. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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III. Regulating Mutual Funds: Advisers‟ Fiduciary Duty 
 
The relationship between the adviser and board of a 
mutual fund can have a detrimental effect on shareholders. 
The adviser wants fees as high as possible, but the board is 
responsible, as the shareholders‟ agent, for negotiating the best 
deal possible for shareholders.23 Of course, the board, which 
often consists of the adviser‟s business contacts, employees, and 
others who are partial to the adviser, does not always act on 
behalf of the shareholders‟ best interests.24 
In 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act 
“as a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme to protect 
investment company shareholders from self-dealing and other 
abuses that were perceived to be rampant throughout the 
mutual fund industry.”25 “As mutual funds experienced rapid 
growth in the 1950s and 1960s, investment advisers earned 
fees which did not necessarily reflect perceived economies of 
scale realized in managing larger funds.”26 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) authorized the Wharton School of 
Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania to 
study the mutual fund industry in the wake of this sudden 
growth.27 The Wharton Report found that investment advisers 
charged “relatively high rates,” which competitive market 
forces did not reduce because of the close association between 
the advisers and the fund.28 In addition, the report indicated 
that advisers charged substantially higher fees to mutual fund 
investors than those to institutional investors.29 
In response to the SEC report, Congress added Section 
36(b) to the Investment Company Act in 1970.30 Section 36(b) 
 
23. Dillon, supra note 1, at 287. 
24. Id. 
25. James N. Benedict et al., Recent Developments in Litigation Under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, SM086 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 391, 405 (2007). 
26. Id. at 406. 
27. WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, 
H.R. REP. NO. 87-2274, at 28 (1962). 
28. Id. at 29. 
29. Id. 
30. See Daily Income Fund, Inc., et al. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537-38 
(1984). 
5
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established a fiduciary duty “with respect to the receipt of 
compensation for services” between the investment advisor and 
the shareholders.31 Section 36(b) also expressly provides a right 
of action for private citizens: 
 
An action may be brought under this subsection 
by the Commission, or by a security holder of 
such registered investment company on behalf of 
such company, against such investment adviser, 
or any affiliated person of such investment 
adviser, or any other person enumerated in 
subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary 
duty concerning such compensation or payments, 
for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such 
compensation or payments paid by such 
registered investment company or by the security 
holders thereof to such investment adviser or 
person.32 
 
IV. Section 36(b) Standard 
 
A. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. 
 
The key case that has set the standard for interpreting and 
applying Section 36(b) is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset 
Management, Inc.,33 a mutual fund excessive fee case decided 
in 1982.34 In Gartenberg, plaintiff shareholders held shares in 
the money market fund35 “Merrill Lynch‟s Ready Asset 
Trust.”36 They claimed that the fund “realized cost savings 
through economies of scale, but was not passing the savings on 
 
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b)(2) (West 2010). 
32. Id. § 80a-35(b). 
33. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
34. Id. 
35. “A money market fund is a type of mutual fund that is required by 
law to invest in low-risk securities.” U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n, Money 
Market Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2011). 
36. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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to shareholders through lower fees.”37 Thus, plaintiffs alleged 
that the compensation paid by the fund to investment adviser, 
Merrill Lynch, was excessive and constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duty in violation of Section 36(b) of the Investment 
Company Act.38 The district court entered judgment dismissing 
the plaintiff‟s case and found that the compensation paid to the 
adviser was fair.39 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the 
court “erred in rejecting a „reasonableness‟ standard for 
determining whether the [adviser] performed its „fiduciary 
duty‟ in compliance with § 36(b).”40 The plaintiffs also argued 
that the court erred in their analysis of the defendant‟s breach 
of fiduciary duty by comparing the management fees of the 
other money market funds.41 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court‟s judgment.42 The court held that, in order “[t]o be guilty 
of a violation of § 36(b), . . . the adviser-manager must charge a 
fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no 
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not 
have been the product of arm‟s-length bargaining.”43 In 
addition, the court set out six factors to consider when applying 
the fiduciary duty standard under Section 36(b): “(a) the nature 
and quality of services provided to fund shareholders; (b) the 
profitability of the fund to the adviser-manager; (c) fallout 
benefits: (d) economies of scale; (e) comparative fee structures; 
and (f) the independence and conscientiousness of the 
trustees.”44 
 
B. Jones v. Harris Associates 
 
Jones v. Harris Associates45 was the most recent mutual 
fund fee case that came before the Supreme Court. Harris 
 
37. Johnson, supra note 10, at 158. 
38. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 925, 927. 
41. Id. at 929. 
42. Id. at 934. 
43. Id. at 928. 
44. Johnson, supra note 10, at 159. 
45. 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010). 
7
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Associates L.P. is an investment advisement company that 
managed six open-ended funds collectively known as the 
Oakmark complex of funds, which was based Chicago, 
Illinois.46 The Oakmark board annually reselected Harris as its 
investment adviser and, accordingly, determined Harris‟ 
compensation.47 In determining such compensation, the board 
looked at various factors, including the services provided by 
Harris, the fees charged to other clients of Harris, the fees of 
other investment advisers charged to similar funds, and the 
fund‟s performance.48 
The plaintiffs owned shares in several of the funds.49 In 
August 2004, three plaintiffs-investors brought derivative suits 
on behalf of the mutual funds claiming that Harris was in 
violation of its fiduciary duty under Section 36(b) of the 
Investment Company Act. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged 
that Harris charged Oakmark funds fees that far exceeded fees 
charged to other clients for identical services.50 The District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the 
Gartenberg test and found that Harris‟ fees were not excessive 
because they were similar to those charged to other mutual 
funds.51 The court held that, in order for plaintiffs to sustain a 
claim under Section 36(b), the plaintiff must show that the fees 
“were so disproportionately large that they could not have been 
the result of arm‟s-length bargaining.”52 Thus, Harris 
Associates was not in violation of 36(b) because its fees were 
“ordinary” and similar to those of other funds.53 Accordingly, 
the court granted defendants summary judgment. 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs disclaimed 
the use of the Gartenberg standard.54 First, the plaintiffs 
 
46. Id. at 629; Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 27, 2007). 
47. Jones, 2007 WL 627640, at *1. 
48. Id. 
49. Jones, 527 F.3d at 629. 
50. See Matthew Rinegar, Jones v. Harris Associates: Shareholder 
Requirements for Proving a Mutual Fund Adviser’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL‟Y SIDEBAR 45, 47 (2009). 
51. Jones, 2007 WL 627640, at *7-8. 
52. Id. at *7. 
53. Id. at *8. 
54. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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argued that the standard relies too much on market prices, 
which is “inappropriate because fees are set incestuously 
rather than by competition.” The plaintiffs next argued that 
instead, the “market for advisory services to unaffiliated 
institutional clients” should be used as the benchmark of 
reasonable fees.55 As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, “[t]he 
first argument stems from the fact investment advisers create 
mutual funds, which they dominate notwithstanding the 
statutory requirement that 40% of trustees be disinterested. . . 
. The second argument rests on the fact that Harris Associates, 
like many other investment advisers, has institutional clients 
(such as pension funds) that pay less.”56 Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs claimed that Harris Associates charges its mutual 
fund shareholders significantly higher management fees than 
its institutional clients.57 Fees for the Oakmark fund were 1 
percent of the first two billion in assets, while independent 
clients were charged about .5 percent of the first five hundred 
million.58 
Despite the plaintiffs‟ arguments, Judge Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit gave an opinion affirming the lower court‟s 
judgment dismissing the claims against Harris Associates. 
While Judge Easterbrook was also skeptical of Gartenberg, he 
refused to use the approach for a very different reason, stating 
“just as the plaintiffs are skeptical of Gartenberg because it 
relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical about 
Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”59 
The Seventh Circuit therefore established a new standard 
under 36(b), holding that “[a] fiduciary must make full 
disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.”60 The court ultimately presumed that mutual 
fund markets are efficient and that this market competition 
 
55. Id. at 631. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. James F. Koehler & P. Wesley Lambert, The Supreme Court’s Review 
of Jones v. Harris Associates and 36(b) Claims Under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940—A Prospective and Analytical View, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 
63, 69 (2009) (citing Jones, 527 F.3d at 631). 
59. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632. 
60. Id. 
9
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would establish the adviser‟s compensation.61 The court further 
qualified its interpretation of 36(b), indicating that “[i]t is 
possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court will 
infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons 
responsible for decision have abdicated . . . .”62 
Chief Judge Easterbrook‟s majority opinion relies heavily 
on the existence of a competitive market.63 Professor William 
A. Birdthistle of Chicago‟s Kent Law School noted the 
importance in Easterbrook‟s holding that “(a) the investment 
industry is very competitive, (b) . . . in any well-functioning 
industry, market competition keeps fees low, and (c) advisers 
„can‟t make money‟ from its funds if „high fees drive investors 
away.‟”64 Easterbrook emphasized the importance of disclosure, 
asserting that “[f]ederal securities laws . . . work largely by 
requiring disclosure and then allowing price to be set by 
competition in which investors make their own choices.”65 In 
addition, he “disregarded comparisons between institutional 
investors and captive mutual funds because „no court would 
inquire whether a salary normal among similar institutions is 
excessive.‟”66 
Judge Easterbrook ultimately took a neoclassical economic 
approach to the case that depended on the notion that market 
forces will constrain advisory fees.67 The court essentially found 
that “many sophisticated investors in hedge funds pay 
disproportionately high fees, and therefore, high fees alone are 
insufficient to support a fiduciary duty claim under the 
statute.”68 Thus, despite the incestuous relationship between 
mutual funds and their advisors, Easterbrook argued that 
investors still had the option to move their money elsewhere if 
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral 
Approach Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 91 (2010). 
64. William Birdthistle, Chief Judge Easterbrook & Classical Law & 
Economics, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/03/chief-judge-easterbrook-and-
classical-law-economics.html. 
65. Jones, 527 F.3d at 635. 
66. Johnson, supra note 10, at 162. 
67. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 88-89. 
68. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 72. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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they found a mutual fund‟s fees to be too excessive. 
On August 8, 2008, Judge Richard A. Posner filed a dissent 
to the Seventh Circuit‟s decision to deny a rehearing of the 
case.69 His dissent disagreed with the Seventh Circuit‟s 
disapproval of the Gartenberg standard and highlighted the 
fact that Jones was the only case that disclaimed the Second 
Circuit opinion.70 Posner emphasized that the majority‟s 
market forces approach was inappropriate and based upon “an 
economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis of 
growing indications that executive compensation in large 
publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble 
incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.”71 
Posner criticized Easterbrook‟s reliance on market 
competition, arguing that “[m]utual funds are a component of 
the financial services industry, where abuses have been 
rampant . . . .”72 Posner focused primarily on the disparity in 
advisory fees charged by mutual funds and those charged by 
institutional investors where captive mutual funds are charged 
more than twice that of institutional funds.73 Posner addressed 
the problem of the absence of arm‟s-length bargaining in the 
mutual fund context.   
Posner‟s dissent illustrated the modification of Gartenberg, 
or the Gartenberg-plus standard. He argued that there cannot 
be arm‟s-length negotiation when only comparing mutual fund 
fees among similar funds.74 Rather, different fees should be 
examined in comparison to both mutual funds and institutional 
funds.75 This, Posner argued, is the only way arm‟s-length 
negotiation would occur.76 “Because „the usual arm‟s length 
bargaining between strangers does not occur between an 
adviser and the fund,‟ the judicial task is to find a proxy for 
what arm‟s length bargaining might have produced.”77 The 
 
69. Jones, 537 F.3d 728 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 729. 
71. Id. at 730. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 731. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 161 (footnote omitted). 
11
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arm‟s-length transactions used by institutional investors “can 
and should be used as reliable benchmarks when judging the 
unfairness of prices set by a fund adviser for portfolio 
management services rendered to a captive fund.”78 
Judge Posner argued that this factor should include a 
comparison of the fees charged to mutual funds and those 
charged to institutional clients.79 Essentially, “advisors should 
be able to pass the additional variable costs of administering a 
retail fund over an institutional fund to retail clients, but a 
management fee in excess of the additional administrative 
costs should strongly indicate investment advisors have 
breached their fiduciary duties.”80 Thus, the Posner standard 
acknowledges the unique nature of mutual funds and 
ultimately allows for increased shareholder protection from 
excessive fees as Congress intended in promulgating the 1940 
Investment Company Act. 
 
V. The Supreme Court Decision 
 
On March 9, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
hear the case. The issue before the Court was what standard to 
apply when reviewing a claim of an investment adviser‟s 
excessive fee under 36(b) of the Investment Company Act. 
Particularly, the Court examined whether the Seventh Circuit 
contravened the Investment Company Act in holding that a 
shareholder‟s claim that the fund‟s investment adviser charged 
an excessive fee is not cognizable under 36(b).81 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the majority opinion 
of the Court and upheld the longstanding approach set forth in 
Gartenberg: 
 
[W]e conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its 
basic formulation of what § 36(b) requires: to face 
liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser 
must charge a fee that is so disproportionately 
 
78. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 141. 
79. Johnson, supra note 10, at 174. 
80. Id. at 174-75 (footnote omitted). 
81. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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large that it bears no reasonable relationship to 
the services rendered and could not have been 
the product of arm‟s length bargaining.82 
 
Justice Alito engaged in a systematic analysis of 36(b) and 
addressed the issue of “what a mutual fund shareholder must 
prove in order to show that a mutual fund investment adviser 
breached the „fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of 
compensation for services‟ that is imposed by § 36(b) of the 
[Act] . . . .”83 
Justice Alito engaged in a defense of the Gartenberg 
standard, indicating that the veteran approach “fully 
incorporates [the] understanding of the fiduciary duty as set 
out in Pepper and reflects § 36(b)(1)‟s imposition of the burden 
on the plaintiff.”84 Justice Alito also emphasized the standard‟s 
relationship to the protections provided by the Investment 
Company Act. In particular, the Court highlighted the 
importance of the Act‟s role in providing checks and balances 
on excessive fees. The Act focuses on “disinterested directors as 
„independent watchdogs‟ of the relationship between a mutual 
fund and its adviser.”85 In turn, the Act requires advisers to 
provide directors with all the information “reasonably . . . 
necessary”86 to determine whether an adviser‟s compensation is 
excessive. The Court then emphasized that Gartenberg 
encompasses the importance of providing some measure of 
deference to a board‟s judgment and that such measures of 
deference may vary depending on the circumstances.87 
The Court next addressed the hot-button issue of 
comparing fees charged by an adviser to a captive mutual fund 
and those charged to its independent or institutional investors. 
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit rejected a comparison of the 
fees the adviser charged a money market fund and those 
 
82. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010). 
83. Id. at 1422. 
84. Id. at 1427. 
85. Id. 
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(c) (West 2010). 
87. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1421. 
13
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charged to a pension fund.88 Justice Alito again took no sides 
and instead indicated that “courts must give comparisons . . . 
the weight they merit in light of the similarities and differences 
between the services that clients in question require . . . the 
court must be wary of inapt comparisons.”89 The Court also 
noted that courts should not rely too heavily on the fees 
charged by other advisers to mutual funds because they may 
not be the product of arm‟s length negotiations.90 
Finally, Justice Alito noted how courts should evaluate an 
investment adviser‟s fiduciary duty. Courts should afford 
deference to the outcome of board‟s bargaining process when 
such process involves a “robust” review of investment-adviser 
compensation.91 “Thus, if the disinterested directors considered 
the relevant factors, their decision to approve a particular fee 
agreement is entitled to considerable weight, even if a court 
might weigh the factors differently.”92 On the other hand, the 
board‟s decision should be subject to more rigorous scrutiny if 
its negotiation and review process was “deficient” because an 
adviser‟s failure “to disclose material information to the board . 
. . might have hampered the board‟s ability to function as „an 
independent check upon the management.‟”93 While courts may 
engage in this evaluation of a board‟s decision regarding 
adviser compensation, Justice Alito warned against “judicial 
second-guessing” as part of determining a 36(b) fiduciary 
breach.94 “In reviewing compensation under § 36(b), the Act 
does not require courts to engage in a precise calculation of fees 
representative of arm‟s-length bargaining.”95 
While the Court noted the Seventh Circuit‟s error in 
focusing on disclosure, it left the debate between Judge 
Easterbrook and Judge Posner to Congress.96 In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Thomas declined to characterize the majority 
 
88. Id. at 1426 (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930, n.3). 
89. Id. at 1421. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1429. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1430 (citation omitted). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1430. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/8
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opinion as an affirmation of the Gartenberg standard.97 Rather, 
Justice Thomas assured that Gartenberg should not be read to 
“countenance the free-ranging judicial „fairness‟ review of fees 
that Gartenberg could be read to authorize.”98 The Court 
vacated the Seventh Circuit decision and remanded the case for 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.99 
 
VI. Debriefing the Supreme Court Decision 
 
A. The Consequences of Reaffirming Gartenberg 
 
In the great debate between Judge Easterbrook and Judge 
Posner, Justice Alito took no sides, but rather maintained the 
status quo in upholding the Gartenberg standard. Considering 
the heated Easterbrook-Posner conflict over the disclosure and 
comparative fee structures, Justice Alito‟s interpretation of 
36(b) focuses more on the “watchdog” role of disinterested 
directors and the need for advisors to provide a board with the 
reasonable information necessary to determine whether an 
adviser‟s fee is excessive. This is significant, considering the 
impact the decision could and will have on mutual fund adviser 
compensation. As one scholar rightly predicted prior to the 
March 2010 decision, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Jones 
ultimately turned on whether the Court believed that courts 
should be determining the reasonableness of investment 
adviser fees.100 In affirming Gartenberg, the Supreme Court 
took the position of maintaining the status quo of allowing 
courts to have some say in determining reasonable 
compensation, while also giving deference to the business 
judgment of mutual fund boards. 
This decision is problematic for critics of the Gartenberg 
approach, and for plaintiff investors who have never won a suit 
under the standard. Gartenberg has been, for the last thirty 
years, the judicial standard for the determination of excessive 
fees under 36(b). However, a clear flaw in the Gartenberg 
 
97. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. (majority opinion). 
100. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 80. 
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standard has surfaced in light of Justice Posner‟s dissent. 
While Gartenberg acknowledged that the standard for testing 
the reasonableness of a fiduciary‟s compensation in a self-
dealing transaction is an arm‟s length price,101 it failed to 
specify from which marketplace the comparable market prices 
are to be extracted. As a result, Gartenberg allows funds to 
defend their fees by comparing them to fees paid by other 
mutual funds. This comparison would be reasonable if advisers 
competed with one another to service mutual funds, but as 
discussed above, the relationship between a mutual fund and 
its adviser does not allow for such competition to exist. As 
Judge Posner pointed out in his dissent, “[t]he governance 
structure that enables mutual fund advisers to charge 
exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel‟s comparability 
approach would if widely followed allow those fees to become 
the industry‟s floor.”102 
Many scholars have also criticized the Gartenberg 
standard for its failure to provide meaningful shareholder 
protection.103 The fact that no one has ever prevailed on a 36(b) 
claim suggests that most funds which have been sued maintain 
fees roughly proportionate to their competition.104 In addition, 
Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” language has been 
criticized as vague and contrary to the conception of fiduciary 
duty.105 The language has enabled advisers to argue 
successfully that the 36(b) duty is narrow. The language also 
suggests that “relief is unavailable under § 36(b) unless a court 
is convinced as a substantive economic matter that a 
challenged fee is simply too high, without regard to either the 
fairness of the fee-setting process or the rates negotiated at 
arm‟s length by non-mutual fund clients of the adviser.”106 
While it seems that Justice Alito simply maintained the 
status quo, perhaps Justice Thomas was right in clarifying that 
 
101. Freeman et al., supra note 2, at 140. 
102. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Posner, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded by 130 S. Ct. 1418, 176 L. Ed. 
2d 265 (2010). 
103. Johnson, supra note 10, at 166. 
104. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 88. 
105. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 157. 
106. Id. 
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the Court‟s decision was not an affirmation of the Gartenberg 
standard, but rather a clarification for future interpretations of 
Gartenberg. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote 
that he “would not shortchange the Court‟s effort by describing 
it as affirmation of the „Gartenberg standard.‟”107 Rather, 
Justice Thomas warned against the way that the district court 
and court of appeals emphasized “fee „fairness‟ and 
proportionality . . . in a manner that could be read to permit 
the equivalent of the judicial rate regulation the Gartenberg 
opinions disclaim.”108 In other words, courts must be wary of 
interpreting Gartenberg in a way that allows the judiciary to 
engage in actual rate regulation. This position that courts 
should not be too involved in determining compensation could 
explain the Supreme Court‟s decision not to modify Gartenberg. 
 
B. Overturning Judge Easterbrook and the Seventh Circuit  
 
 The Supreme Court was very forceful in its rejection of 
Judge Easterbrook‟s disclosure-focused interpretation and his 
denunciation of the Gartenberg standard. Since the decision 
came out in 2007, Judge Easterbrook‟s market forces approach 
has faced a mountain of criticism. Among the biggest 
disagreements with the Seventh Circuit approach is its 
improper reliance on competition, its interpretation of the 36(b) 
statute contrary its language and purpose, and the 
establishment of a standard focusing only on disclosure. Justice 
Alito clearly stated that “[b]y focusing almost entirely on the 
element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred.”109 In 
defense of Gartenberg, Justice Alito further stated that while 
the standard “which the panel rejected, may lack sharp 
analytical clarity . . . we believe that it accurately reflects the 
compromise that is embodied in § 36(b), and it has provided a 
workable standard for nearly three decades.”110 
 
107. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
108. Id. 
109. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated, 
130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010). 
110. Id. 
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In relying on a competitive market, Easterbrook‟s standard 
failed to even consider and take into account arm‟s length 
bargaining. “The court‟s decision ultimately put its faith in the 
presumed sophistication of individual investors to keep 
investment adviser fees competitive by shopping around for 
mutual funds with lower fees.”111 Judge Easterbrook, however, 
ignored the context of mutual funds and the fact that they are 
“often composed of interested parties, semi-interested parties, 
or advisers of other mutual funds, resulting in a truly „captive‟ 
board more interested in creating profits for the adviser than 
the fund.”112 
Judge Easterbrook argued only that 36(b) requires 
disclosure, that there be no fraud, and acknowledges that 
compensation could be “so unusual” that a court would infer 
deceit.113 Judge Easterbrook looked to the law of trusts114 in 
articulating a new standard for 36(b) that “[a] fiduciary duty 
must make full disclosure and play no tricks . . . .”115 While it is 
a crucial part of satisfying a fiduciary duty, disclosure alone 
would not protect fund shareholders from excessive fees. 
Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook‟s standard essentially 
ignored the language and purpose of 36(b).116 Judge 
Easterbrook‟s conclusion that 36(b) merely required that “[a] 
fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks” 
eliminates the substance from the fiduciary duty.117 Professor 
William A. Birdthistle argues that “[t]he specificity of the 
phrase „with respect to the receipt of compensation for services‟ 
strongly suggests that Section 36(b) created a new kind of 
fiduciary duty beyond the simple avoidance of defrauding an 
investor, as Easterbrook suggested.”118 Indeed, the language of 
36(b) itself “provides that the board‟s approval „shall be given 
such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under 
 
111. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 52. 
112. Id. 
113. Johnson, supra note 10, at 167. 
114. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 90. 
115. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) vacated, 
130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010). 
116. Johnson, supra note 10, at 168. 
117. Birdthistle, supra note 63, at 90. 
118. Id. at 99. 
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all circumstances.‟”119 This language implies a more thorough 
test regarding the excessiveness of fees, rather than Judge 
Easterbrook‟s narrow and deferential standard.120  
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Consideration of Gallus  
 
In a decision that came out just months after Jones, the 
Eighth Circuit, in John E. Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial,121 
adopted and added to Posner‟s standard. The facts in Gallus 
are very similar to those in the Jones case. The plaintiffs were 
shareholders of eleven mutual funds that were advised by 
Ameriprise.122 The plaintiffs asserted that Ameriprise breached 
its fiduciary duty under 36(b) for misleading the fund board 
during negotiations and demanding excessive fees.123 The 
Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that 
no 36(b) violation occurred simply because the defendant‟s fee 
passed muster under the standard in Gartenberg.124 
The Eighth Circuit focused primarily on the discrepancy 
between fees charged to institutional investors and those 
charged to mutual funds.125 The court ultimately adopted a test 
that combines the Gartenberg factors and Judge Posner‟s 
standard. “The court found that a proper evaluation of § 36(b) 
should include a comparison between fees charged to 
institutional clients and mutual fund clients.”126 Furthermore, 
the Eighth Circuit indicated that “the proper approach to 36(b) 
is one that looks to both the adviser‟s conduct during 
negotiation and the end result.”127  
The Supreme Court appeared to consider the Eighth 
 
119. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 52. 
120. Id. 
121. 561 F.3d 816, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 
(2010). 
122. Id. at 818. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 823. 
125. The plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that the fees charged 
by the adviser to retail mutual funds were nearly double those charged to 
institutional investors. Id. at 819. 
126. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 75 (footnote omitted). 
127. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 822-23 (8th Cir. 
2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). 
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Circuit‟s approach to look “to both the adviser‟s conduct during 
negotiation and the end result.”128 Additional evidence of 
irregularities in the negotiation process should be relevant to 
the inquiry.129 While the size of the fee itself is an important 
factor to consider, this factor “should not be construed to create 
a safe harbor of exorbitance.”130 The Eighth Circuit read the 
plain language of 36(b) to impose a duty of honesty and 
transparency on advisers during the negotiation process.131 The 
justification for the inclusion of such evidence is found within 
other statutory and regulatory requirements of the Investment 
Company Act: 
 
Section 10(a) of the ICA requires that at least 
40% of a fund‟s board of directors not be 
“interested persons” with regard to the adviser. 
Furthermore, Section 15(c) of the ICA requires 
that advisory fee agreements be approved by a 
majority vote of the disinterested directors cast 
in person at a special meeting “called for the 
purpose of voting on such approval” after the 
disinterested directors have been provided “such 
information as may reasonably be necessary to 
evaluate the terms of any contract.” Advisory 
agreements that the adviser knows to have been 
made in violation of these structural 
requirements are void and subject to rescission 
under § 47(b) of the ICA.132 
 
“Thus, a court entering a Section 36(b) claim may 
determine that a fee has been unlawfully received under 
Section 36(b) if it finds, as a threshold matter, that the adviser 
knows that the fee was not approved following deliberations by 
a disinterested board acting independently.”133 This was an 
 
128. Id. 
129. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 79. 
130. Id. at 76. 
131. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 823. 
132. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 160. 
133. Id. at 160-61. 
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issue in Jones, where the adviser knew that the fee was 
approved by a conflicted board with a director who turned out 
to be interested, rather than disinterested. The Seventh Circuit 
dismissed evidence of the director‟s interested status. With the 
inclusion of evidence that occurred during negotiations, courts 
may determine that any “unscrupulous behavior” by an advisor 
during and after negotiations is a breach of that adviser‟s 
fiduciary duty under 36(b).134  
Thus, the Supreme Court‟s consideration of the Eighth 
Circuit‟s look at adviser conduct could place more scrutiny on 
mutual fund boards and their determination of reasonable 
adviser compensation.135 Emphasizing the watchdog role of 
disinterested directors, Justice Alito declared that “[u]nder the 
Act, scrutiny of investment adviser compensation by a fully 
informed mutual fund board is the „cornerstone of the . . . effort 
to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.”136 Justice 
Alito essentially stated that courts should afford fund boards 
deference when they have considered all the relevant factors in 
determining adviser compensation, but greater scrutiny is 
justified with evidence of some interference with a fund board‟s 
decision, such as an adviser‟s failure to disclose important 
information regarding compensation.137 Thus, it seems that the 
Court clarified the Gartenberg interpretation of the 36(b) 
standard to emphasize both a board and adviser‟s ability to 
defend their fees determination. 
 
D. Critiquing the Supreme Court’s Ruling 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision, two scholars provided 
an interesting observation: 
 
To predict the outcome, one must ask why the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in the 
 
134. See Gallus, 561 F.3d at 823. 
135. Jessica Toonkel Marquez, High Court Ruling Opens Door for More 
Lawsuits Over Mutual Fund Fees, INVESTMENT NEWS, Apr. 4, 2010, 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100404/REG/304049991. 
136. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1427. 
137. Id. at 1427-28. 
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first place. No one has prevailed on a § 36(b) 
claim under the Gartenberg standard. The 
Seventh Circuit opinion lays down an even more 
arduous standard . . . . Perhaps the Supreme 
Court, as a sign of the times, feels compelled to 
set a standard plaintiffs can meet.138 
 
While the Supreme Court may not necessarily have felt 
compelled to set an easier standard for plaintiffs, Justice Alito 
spent time explaining the Court‟s limited role in the 
determination of a fund adviser‟s excessive compensation. 
Justice Alito focused heavily on the fact that courts do not have 
rate-setting responsibilities.139 “In reviewing compensation 
under § 36(b), the Act does not require courts to engage in a 
precise calculation of fees representative of arm‟s-length 
bargaining.”140 Furthermore, courts should not interfere with 
the business judgment and discretion of fund boards. Even 
conflicts of interest that may call for some restraints on board 
discretion do “not suggest that a court may supplant the 
judgment of disinterested directors apprised of all relevant 
information . . . .”141 
Despite Justice Alito‟s reflection of “congressional choice „to 
rely largely upon [independent director] „watchdogs‟ to protect 
shareholders interests,‟”142 this Note argues that the Supreme 
Court should have adopted a more shareholder-friendly 
standard such as that advocated by Gallus and others as the 
proper determination of the 36(b) fiduciary duty standard. On 
appeal of Gallus, the Supreme Court reached a decision on 
April 5, 2010 to vacate the judgment and remand the case to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
light of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Jones.143 This decision 
raises questions as to the impact the Court‟s decision will have 
on the Gallus plaintiffs, and more importantly, for future 
 
138. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 85. 
139. Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418. 
140. Id. at 1430 (citation omitted). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. (alterations in original). 
143. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). 
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plaintiff investors. The Court‟s affirmation of Gartenberg is 
essentially an affirmation of the plaintiffs‟ loss for advocates of 
a more proactive judicial stance on compensation that 
emphasizes the importance of the institutional and mutual 
fund fee comparison. 
 Thus, this Note asserts that the Supreme Court should 
have strongly considered the Gallus standard‟s emphasis on 
both the importance of disclosure as well as the inclusion of 
Posner‟s comparative fee structure. Justice Alito placed little 
weight on the debate over the comparative fee structure. The 
Court explained that “[e]ven if the services provided and fees 
charged to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be 
mindful that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity 
between mutual funds and institutional clients . . . .”144 While 
the Act may not provide for assurances of fee parity, the Jones 
petitioners‟ argument for comparison of fees charged to 
institutional investors and those charged to mutual funds is 
certainly a valid one. In fact, the SEC also took this position in 
its amicus brief for the petitioners and relied on trust law.145 
The SEC urged the Court to interpret the 36(b) fiduciary duty 
in accordance with trust law and provided evidence from its 
own study, which concluded that “board and shareholder 
approval could not protect shareholder interests with respect to 
advisory compensation because mutual funds could not, as a 
practical matter, terminate their relationship with advisers.”146 
Thus, in order to simulate arm‟s-length bargaining, courts 
should be able to engage in a comparison of fees charged to 
mutual funds with those charged to institutional investors, 
which does involve the arm‟s length bargaining of contracts.   
While Justice Alito was merited in criticizing the Seventh 
Circuit‟s dominant focus on disclosure, the element of 
disclosure still warrants stronger consideration than that 
provided by the Court. The incorporation of disclosure into the 
interpretation of the fiduciary duty includes the importance of 
the comparative fee structure as a remedy to the arm‟s length 
bargaining concern in the mutual fund context. The Jones 
 
144. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1429 (2010). 
145. Koehler & Lambert, supra note 58, at 76-77. 
146. Id. at 76. 
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petitioners argued that the fiduciary duty under 36(b) should 
consist of “an obligation to disclose „all material facts relating 
to‟ compensation and an obligation that the compensation they 
receive be fair and negotiated for „in an arm‟s-length 
transaction.‟”147 
In particular, the petitioners stated that Congress‟ use of 
the term “fiduciary duty” in 36(b) should be interpreted with its 
common law meaning.148 Petitioners looked to the Supreme 
Court‟s rule of construction in Neder v. United States, which 
states that “„[w]here Congress uses terms that have 
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of 
these terms.‟”149 The common law meaning of a fiduciary duty 
includes the accurate disclosure of all material facts to a 
beneficiary, as well as a fair transaction.150 Thus, petitioners 
argue that, because Congress has not unequivocally expressed 
a contrary intent to the traditional definition to fiduciary duty, 
the Court should interpret the 36(b) fiduciary duty in 
accordance with its common law meaning. The petitioners also 
point out that the common law interpretation of fiduciary duty 
is in line with Congress‟ intent to include such a duty within 
36(b): 
 
[The Supreme Court‟s cases] and the legislative 
history recognize Congress‟s understanding that 
arm‟s-length bargaining was absent from the 
usual captive mutual-fund structure and that 
investment advisers were obtaining economies of 
scale that should be shared with fund 
shareholders. The history further demonstrates 
 
147. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 53. 
148. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586), 2009 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451, at *10-11, *38-39; see also Rinegar, supra note 50, at 
53 (discussing Petitioners‟assertion that “§ 36(b) uses the term „fiduciary 
duty,‟ a term which had a „set‟ common law meaning”). 
149. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999) (quoting Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)). 
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g (2007). 
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that Congress‟s purpose in enacting § 36(b) was 
to replace the unduly restrictive corporate waste 
standard for challenging adviser fees with a more 
effective standard anchored in familiar principles 
of fiduciary-duty law.151 
 
While Justice Alito addressed this issue in his opinion and 
settled the dispute between petitioners and respondents 
regarding the meaning of “fiduciary duty” under 36(b),152 he 
found it “unnecessary to take sides in this dispute,”153 and 
merely reemphasized the Court‟s decision in Pepper v. Litton.154 
As stated above, petitioners argued that the meaning derives 
from trust law; respondents disagreed contending “that the 
term „fiduciary‟ is not exclusive to the law of trusts” and that 
the term means different things in various contexts.155 Pepper 
illustrates the burden and “rigorous scrutiny” imposed on 
directors “not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but 
also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the 
corporation . . . . The essence of the test is whether or not under 
all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of 
an arm‟s length bargain.”156 According to Justice Alito, this was 
the meaning of the 36(b) fiduciary duty. He argued that the 
Investment Company Act modified this duty by shifting “the 
burden of proof from the fiduciary to the party claiming breach, 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1), to show that the fee is outside the 
range that arm‟s-length bargaining would produce.”157 While 
this may be true, petitioner‟s argument for the use of the 
common law meaning of fiduciary duty, and therefore the 
inclusion of disclosure as part of that duty under 36(b), should 
have been given more weight to allow for more adequate 
shareholder protections against excessive fees. 
 Petitioner‟s argument for the common law interpretation of 
 
151. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586) (June 10, 
2009), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451, at *28-29. 
152. Jones, 130 S.Ct. at 1427. 
153. Id. 
154. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 1427 (citing Litton, 308 U.S. at 306-07) (emphasis omitted). 
157. Id. 
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36(b) would constitute an expansion of the current Gartenberg 
standard because it would incorporate “more evidence into the 
analysis of objective fairness and also incorporates other 
procedural requirements of the [Investment Company Act] into 
the private action.”158 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit‟s 
interpretation of the 36(b) standard constituted, as petitioners 
contend, a misstatement of an adviser‟s duty. The fiduciary 
duty of disclosure requires more than just the avoidance of 
playing tricks and committing fraudulent behavior.159 Rather, 
it involves the disclosure of all material facts.160 
Furthermore, 33(b) of the Investment Company Act 
provides obligations for advisers to comply with filing and 
disclosure requirements and makes unlawful the omission of 
“any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made 
therein . . . from being materially misleading.”161 The purpose 
of these disclosure requirements is to help the market function 
rationally, since the disclosure of fees and potential conflicts of 
interest benefit those who purchase shares and pay attention 
to management fees.162 The disclosure of fees was an issue in 
Jones “where the adviser failed to make required disclosures 
either of the deferred compensation agreement with its former-
executive-turned-disinterested-director or the joint investments 
between fund directors and certain of the adviser‟s executive 
and employees.”163 
The requirement of disclosure and the comparative fee 
structure would ultimately facilitate the enforcement of 36(b). 
“In practice, for boards to compare their mutual fund‟s fee to 
the investment adviser‟s institutional clients‟ fees, the adviser 
would have to disclose clearly delineated fees, and report fees 
and expenses independently from one another.”164 
Furthermore, any discrepancy between the fees charged to 
 
158. Rinegar, supra note 50, at 53. 
159. Jones, 130 S.Ct. at 1424. 
160. Brief for Petitioners, Jones, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (No. 08- 586) (June 10, 
2009), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 451,*21. 
161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-33(b) (West 2010). 
162. Greabe et al., supra note 15, at 161. 
163. Id. at 161-62. 
164. Emily D. Johnson, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive 
Fee Cases: Ripe for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 177-78 (2009). 
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retail investors and those charged to institutional investors 
should indicate breach. Thus, boards would have to require 
funds to justify an excessive cost, otherwise “they would be 
shirking their responsibilities to shareholders.165 36(b) does not 
give the board‟s decision conclusive weight, except only as such 
consideration is appropriate in all circumstances.166 “[E]vidence 
a fund adviser or one of its affiliates treats an outsider more 
favorably than the very party to whom the adviser owes 
statutorily-provided fiduciary duties needs to be recognized for 
what it is: prima facie evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.”167 
Requiring full disclosure of fees as well as the comparison of 
institutional and retail investors would ensure more protection 
to shareholders. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
As the Eighth Circuit states, “[t]he Gartenberg case 
demonstrates one way in which a fund adviser can breach its 
fiduciary duty; but it is not the only way.”168 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court clarified yet another interpretation of the 
Gartenberg standard, highlighting its reflection of the true 
meaning of the Section 36(b) fiduciary duty: 
 
[T]he expertise of the independent trustees of a 
fund, whether they are fully informed about all 
facts bearing on the [investment adviser‟s] 
service and fee, and the extent of care and 
conscientiousness with which they perform their 
duties are important factors to be considered in 
deciding whether they and the [investment 
adviser] are guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty 
in violation of § 36(b).169 
 
In focusing more on the role of disinterested directors, the 
 
165. Johnson, supra note 10. 
166. Id. 
167. Freeman et al., supra note 2. 
168. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d at 823. 
169. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2010 WL 1189560, at *9. 
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Supreme Court decision may appear to place more pressure on 
mutual fund boards and advisers to provide reasonable fees. In 
fact, the Supreme Court‟s rejection of the Seventh Circuit‟s 
disclosure-only approach could signify a win for shareholders 
and perhaps lead to more mutual fund fee lawsuits.170 
It seems more likely, however, that Justice Alito‟s decision 
to affirm the Gartenberg standard only maintains the status 
quo for plaintiff investors. While the Court‟s decision provides 
plaintiffs with the hope of winning lawsuits, it does not 
necessarily put them in a better position to win. Justice Alito 
ultimately ignored the significance of the comparative fee issue 
and whether a fund board‟s negotiation process involves arm‟s 
length bargaining at all. In balancing the importance of 
granting deference to mutual fund boards and advisers with 
the dangers of judicial rate-setting, perhaps Justice Alito was 
correct in keeping courts in their place and leaving the issues 
surrounding today‟s mutual fund market to Congress. 
However, the Supreme Court could and should have done more 
in the way of protection of shareholders. 
 
 
170. Marquez, supra note 135. 
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